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ABSTRACT
YouTube is one of the most popular video-sharing websites on the Internet,
allowing users to upload, view and share videos with other users all over the
world. YouTube contains many different types of videos, from homemade
sketches to instructional and educational tutorials, and therefore attracts a wide
variety of users with different interests. The majority of YouTube visits are
perfectly innocent, but there may be circumstances where YouTube video access
is related to a digital investigation, e.g. viewing instructional videos on how to
perform potentially unlawful actions or how to make unlawful articles.
When a user accesses a YouTube video through their browser, certain digital
artefacts relating to that video access may be left on their system in a number of
different locations. However, there has been very little research published in the
area of YouTube video artefacts.
The paper discusses the identification of some of the artefacts that are left by the
Internet Explorer web browser on a Windows system after accessing a YouTube
video. The information that can be recovered from these artefacts can include the
video ID, the video name and possibly a cached copy of the video itself. In
addition to identifying the artefacts that are left, the paper also investigates how
these artefacts can be brought together and analysed to infer specifics about the
user’s interaction with the YouTube website, for example whether the video was
searched for or visited as a result of a suggestion after viewing a previous video.
The result of this research is a Python based prototype that will analyse a mounted
disk image, automatically extract the artefacts related to YouTube visits and
produce a report summarising the YouTube video accesses on a system.
1. INTRODUCTION
YouTube is a popular site for sharing videos which contains a wide range of
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content. While the majority of YouTube visits are perfectly innocent, there may
be circumstances where YouTube video access is related to a digital investigation,
e.g. viewing instructional videos on how to perform potentially unlawful actions
or how to make unlawful articles. This paper investigates the extent to which
these video accesses can be identified. This paper makes a number of
contributions. Firstly it documents some of the artefacts that can be left as a result
of a YouTube visit, particularly that the title of the video can be recovered. It also
demonstrates that it is possible to infer about how a user arrived at a particular
page, either from information extracted from the URL or by creating a timeline of
the artefacts and examining other events that occurred immediately before or
after. The paper also describes a prototype tool that will identify the patterns of
artefacts and report a summary of the YouTube activity.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Overview
This section provides a brief discussion of YouTube, followed by an explanation
of the need for automation in digital forensics, highlighting the increase in the
volume of data that analysts are faced with, but also the need to maintain an audit
trail from raw data to interpreted data and any inferences drawn. The section also
includes a discussion of work related to YouTube digital forensics.
2.2 YouTube
YouTube was founded in 2005 as a video sharing website where users can find,
watch and share videos with others. YouTube has currently over 100 million
users across the world with approximately 2 billion views per day. It also has over
24 hours of video uploaded every minute [1] and as a result of this, YouTube
videos inevitably cover a large range of video topics including political,
instructional and educational videos.
YouTube has strict policies relating to what can and cannot be uploaded to their
website. Videos containing extremism, animal abuse, bomb making or sexual
activities are examples of video content that violates these policies and uploading
videos with content along those lines is prohibited. Although YouTube have
these policies in place, YouTube [2] relies on users to detect inappropriate
content, stating that “when a video gets flagged as inappropriate, we review the
video to determine whether it violates our Terms of Use—flagged videos are not
automatically taken down by the system”. A consequence of this review process
is that it is possible that videos containing illegal or inappropriate content may
exist on YouTube for anyone to view for a period of time. Furthermore, it is
important to remember that digital investigations do not necessarily have to be
part of a law-enforcement investigation and may be an investigation into a
violation of acceptable use policies in a corporate environment [3], or even an
investigation in a education environment into ‘cyber-bullying’[4].
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2.3 Automation in Digital Forensics
Event reconstruction is an integral part of any digital investigation; as described in
Casey [5]; it is the process of piecing together evidence during the initial stages of
an investigation to help develop a better understanding of what events actually
took place.
As part of a digital investigation it is necessary to manually examine and extract
artefacts from a suspect system and carry out event reconstruction. This process
can be difficult and time consuming due to both the complexity of today’s
systems and the volume of data they can hold. Over the past few years the
amount of data on digital devices has increased dramatically and as a result, the
workload for investigators has also increased. By introducing a system that
automatically identifies artefacts and reconstructs them into events, the time spent
by investigators on the higher level analysis phase of an investigation can be
increased. In addition, given the increase in number of digital devices that can be
involved in an investigation, it can also be necessary to prioritise the examination
of one system over another, either due to resource limitations or the time sensitive
nature of an investigation [6]. Automation could help in this prioritisation.
However, there is a difficulty with automating part of a digital forensics
investigation, in that conclusions drawn may ultimately need to be presented in
court. Principle 3 of the ACPO Guidelines on Computer-Based Electronic
Evidence is particularly relevant, which states that “an audit trail or other record
of all processes applied to computer-based electronic evidence should be created
and preserved. An independent third party should be able to examine those
processes and achieve the same result” [7].This is also discussed in Carrier [8]
which describes that error can be potentially introduced at each layer of
abstraction when using forensic analysis tools, and that this error rate should be
captured and taken into account when considering the results. Automated tools
should therefore be able to ‘explain’ any results produced or conclusions that are
drawn, preferably making it straight forward to manually verify the results and
highlighting any potential error.
2.4 Related Work
There has been a small amount of published research on the forensic analysis of
YouTube use. Sureka et al [9] describes a semi-automated system that mines
YouTube with the purpose of discovering both extremist videos and hidden
communities. Their work has been developed to aid law enforcement in dealing
with cyber-crime in the area of radicalisation and has demonstrated that the
automation of even part of a manual process can be beneficial to investigators in
terms of time and overall success rate. However, while the paper is related to
YouTube, is focused on detection of online data and does not assist in the
examination of hard disks that are typically the source of evidence in digital
forensic analyses.
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There has also been some research carried out in the area of automated tools for
answering ‘higher-level’ questions in digital investigations. While not related to
YouTube, Adelstein and Joyce [10] describes an automated extraction tool
capable of determining the presence of peer-to-peer software installed on a system
and extracting evidence based on those results in a forensically sound manner.
The developed tool automates what is described as a “manual and labor-intensive
process” and demonstrates that this sort of automated analysis is feasible, and
suggests that in some cases it is desirable.
2.5 Summary
This section has shown that evidence of YouTube activity may be of interest in
the course of some digital investigations and that there is little published work on
the topic. It has also shown that due to the volume and complexity of data
encountered in the course of investigations some level of automation is
advantageous. However, it has also discussed that while automation is useful to
address these problems, since the output of an analysis may eventually need to be
used in court, an automated tool should provide a full audit trail of how results
were produced.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1 Overview
As discussed in the introduction, this research investigates the possibility of
producing an automated summary of a user’s activity on YouTube for the purpose
of highlighting to an investigator that there may be related evidence of interest.
The research described in this paper is split into several stages. First, the artefacts
that are left on a computer after a user has visited YouTube are identified.
Secondly, experiments are conducted to determine what specific user behaviour
can be inferred from the presence of the artefacts. Finally, in order to automate the
process, a tool is developed that can extract the artefacts and supply an
appropriate summary of user activity based on what has been extracted. The
remainder of this section discuses these steps in detail.
3.2 Scope
As discussed earlier, YouTube videos are usually accessed through a web
browser, which in turn runs on an operating system. There are a several browsers
(e.g. Internet Explorer, Firefox, Chrome, Safari, Opera) and several operating
systems (Windows XP, Vista and 7, Mac OS X, multiple distributions of Linux),
not to mention dedicated YouTube apps as found on iOS. This paper particularly
examines the artefacts left when Internet Explorer 8 is used for this viewing on
Windows 7. Also, the paper considers viewing YouTube videos directly on the
YouTube website rather than embedded videos in other sites.
3.3 Artefact Identification
The first step in the reconstruction of a user’s visit to YouTube is to identify the
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artefacts left behind. There are a number of different methods available that can
be used to help identify changes to a system. These are discussed in Hargreaves &
Chivers [11] the first of which is live logging, i.e. the process of recording
changes to a live system with the help of tools such as Procmon1. The second
method is using snapshots, which involves taking a copy of a test system before
and after an action is carried out and identifying the differences between the two
states. The last method involves creating a list of all the files on the system after
the interaction has taken place and sorting them by date and time to identify any
changed files.
For this research the last method is considered most appropriate. Since the aim of
the research is to automate some of the event reconstruction process, meta-data
associated with files e.g. dates and times, are particularly important. As a result, in
terms of file system artefacts, only files with records that remain in the Master
File Table (MFT) are considered, rather than supplementing them with those
recoverable using file carving techniques. However, the time-based listing of files
is extended, and in addition to the Modified, Accessed, Created and Entry
Modified (MACE) times recovered from the file system, some compound files
(e.g. the Registry hives[12] and index.dats [13] used by Internet Explorer) are also
processed and integrated with the entries from the file system.
Test data is generated through the use of experiments with virtual machines. In
this case VMware Workstation2 is used to virtualise a Windows 7 environment
and various YouTube sites are visited. At all times the actions taken when using
the test system are recorded. After visiting the websites, duplicates are made of
the virtual machine’s hard disk (the .vmdk file), and in addition to the generation
of the sorted list of file system, Registry and index.dat times, where further details
need to be extracted, tools such as X-Ways Forensics3, NetAnalysis4, and
Nirsoft’s suite of History, Cache and Cookie Viewers5 are used.
3.4 User Behaviour
Once the artefacts that are produced during a YouTube visit are identified, the
next step is to compare each set of artefacts with the user’s behaviour. As
discussed in the previous section, the actual user behaviour in the test
environment is documented, which allows artefacts and user actions to be
compared. There are several distinct ‘behaviours’ that are examined. These are:


1
2
3
4
5

The viewing of a video,

Process Monitor - http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb896645
VMware Workstation - http://www.vmware.com/products/workstation/
X-Ways - http://www.x-ways.net/forensics/
NetAnalysis - http://www.digital-detective.co.uk/netanalysis.asp
Nirsoft tools - http://www.nirsoft.net/
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The viewing of a video as a result of a YouTube suggested video,



A YouTube search,



The viewing of a video as a result of a YouTube search.

The purpose of testing these different behaviours is to examine the variation in
artefacts left by a user visiting a YouTube site in different ways. Hargreaves [14]
discusses the importance of demonstrating that a user had intent to visit a
particular website. In this case there may be a question over whether the user
viewed a page containing a video as a result of following a link from another
page, a link in an instant message or email, from a suggested video, or as a result
of using a particular search term.
3.5 Automation
The final stage of this research is the development of a tool that automatically
examines artefacts left (determined from the earlier experiments) and produces a
summary describing the interaction of a user with YouTube, including any
specific behaviour that it is possible to infer. The tool also must provide full
explanation of how any inferences are made. The tool is tested against other
virtual machine disk images where known actions were performed, and the results
compared to determine if the inferred behaviour mirrors reality.
4. RESULTS
4.1 Overview
This section describes the results that were obtained using the methodology
described in the previous sections, i.e. the identification of artefacts, inference of
behaviour and automation of event reconstruction. This section is divided up to
correspond with these stages in the methodology.
4.2 Artefact Identification
As described in Section 3.3, videos were viewed on YouTube using a Virtual
Machine (VM) of Windows 7. As a result of the examination of the VM disk
images, a number of key artefacts were identified that relate to a user visit to
YouTube. These can include a URL that incorporates the video ID, a cached
video file, the video name and references to Google ads. While all these artefacts
can be found, it should be noted that not all of them are always present. The
following sub-sections describe the artefacts in more detail.
4.1.1 YouTube ‘watch’ URL
The first of these artefacts is the YouTube URL. The URL primarily identifies
the address of the video that was accessed by the user and can be divided into two
sections. The URL identified in Figure 1 is described in detail below.
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Figure 1: The ‘basic’ YouTube URL

The first section of the URL identifies the domain name for the YouTube website
i.e. ‘http://www.youtube.com/’. The second section identifies the unique video ID
for the video that was accessed, e.g. ‘watch?v=m8S718JvwX8’. In this example
the unique video ID is ‘m8S718JvwX8’. This URL can be identified and extracted
from the index.dat files that make up the history of Internet Explorer (shown in
Figure 2) and can be found in the master, daily or weekly index.dat files6.

Figure 2: Example of a YouTube video URL in the master index.dat
4.1.2 Video file
When a YouTube video is accessed, it is possible that a copy of the video is
stored within one of the sub-folders in the Temporary Internet Files cache. It is
given the name videoplayback and is usually assigned a version number, e.g.
videoplayback[1]. It is not clear at this time what determines if a video is
definitely stored, how long these videos remain in the cache and under what
circumstances they are deleted.
4.1.3 Video name
The title assigned to a YouTube page that contains a video can also be extracted
from within the index.dat in the History folder. The title is stored within the same

6

However, care must be taken when extracting dates and times from these files as they are not
consistent across different types of index.dat.
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record as the page URL. For example in Figure 3 the title for the page is
‘YouTube - Stuck In Motion - Tokyo Dream’ and the title of the video can be
obtained by removing the initial ‘YouTube’ string.

Figure 3: Example of a YouTube video title in index.dat
4.1.4 Google Ad
A Google Ad artefact may also be present relating to a specific YouTube video
access. The artefact is located within the index.dat file for the Temporary Internet
Files and the URL contains one or more references to the video ID of the video,
which is shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: The Cache index.dat showing the same video ID
4.2 User Behaviour
As described in Section 3.4 there are various user behaviours that can be inferred
from the artefacts identified as a result of a YouTube visit. Behaviours including
searches, video accesses and watching related videos are discussed in this
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section. Figure 5 shows the output of the custom timelining tool showing a set of
file and index.dat changes7.

Figure 5: Timeline of file and index.dat changes
The following sub-sections explain how certain user behaviour can be inferred
from these results.
4.2.1 YouTube video access

7

Some of the changes are omitted and paths shortened to maintain the clarity of the figure.
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As described in the previous sections, when a user visits a YouTube video page
there are a number of artefacts that are created on their system. Figure 6 shows an
example of the artefacts that may be present after such a visit.

Figure 6: First video access
The first and most common artefact for a ‘basic’ video access is the video page
URL. This is stored within an index.dat in Internet Explorer’s History
folder. Within the same record is the video ID, title and the time and date that
video was last visited. Having both the URL and the video title provides more
detail that can be used to determine the nature of the video accessed by the user.
A videoplayback file may also be present within the cache of the system that
relates to the video access. If present, it is a copy of the YouTube video accessed
by the user8. The videoplayback metadata does not contain any information
relating to the associated video ID, title or URL, so currently, the only method of
confirming that the video file is related is by comparing the contents of the video.
As a result, if the file has been deleted (but the MFT entry is still recoverable) it is
not currently possible to conclusively link the videoplayback file to the other
artefacts.
Note that in this case the Google Ad artefact mentioned in Section 4.1.4 is not
present.
4.2.2 YouTube video access as a result of a suggested video
As discussed in Section 4.1.1 when a user watches a video, a copy of the URL for
that video is stored in the index.dat. While the example in the previous section
contains no indication of how the user navigated to the page, in some cases the
structure of the URLs can be used to infer specific user behaviour. Figure 7
shows a slightly more complex example of a URL containing additional
information.

Figure 7: Example URL accessed as a result of a suggested video

8

There may also be additional video content, e.g. advertisements before the actual video played.
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This URL holds information relating to how the URL was navigated to. The
additional string that reads ‘&feature=related’ and is the result of the user
clicking on a suggested video link as seen in Figure 8. There are a number of
different ‘feature’ topics that can be appended to a URL, e.g. ‘top music’ appears
as ‘feature=topvideos_music’.
Also in this example, both the videoplayback file and the associated Google Ad
cache artefact are present.

Figure 8: YouTube suggestions column
4.2.3 YouTube search
The previous section shows one way in which a YouTube video could be reached
(clicking a link for a suggested video). Another route is as a result of a YouTube
search. When a user searches for a video using YouTube they are directed to a
page of video results related to their search term and the URL for this page is
added to an index.dat file within the History folder. The following URL in Figure
9 is an example result of a user’s search for ‘wireless hacking tools’.

Figure 9: Example of a manually created YouTube search URL
The first part of this URL is similar to the video URL discussed in Section 4.1.1,
in that it begins with YouTube’s domain name. The second part of the URL is
specific to the search carried out by the user, containing the actual search term i.e.
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search_query=wireless+hacking+tools. The final part of the URL is related to
YouTube’s auto-complete query option and provides further insight into the
user’s actions including whether they typed the complete search term or typed
part and selected the full term from YouTube’s drop down search menu. In the
previous example in Figure 9, the complete search term was typed by the
user. The URL in Figure 10 is an example of a search that was partially typed by
the user and then automatically completed by clicking on one of the suggested
search terms.

Figure 10: Example of a partially automated YouTube search URL
In this example the search term executed was ‘wireless hacking tools’. The
following part of the URL, ‘&aq=6’, indicates which search term was selected
from the drop down menu. In this case it was the seventh suggestion as
numbering starts from zero. This can be seen in Figure 11. The final part of this
URL, ‘&oq=wireless+hack’, indicates how much of the search term was
physically typed in by the user before selecting the suggested search term. In this
case ‘wireless hack’ was typed, also shown in Figure 11.

Figure 11: Choosing a suggested search term in YouTube
4.2.4 YouTube video access as a result of a search
Unlike the example provided of viewing a page as a result of a suggested video,
accessing a video as a result of a search does not contain any information in the
URL that can easily demonstrate this. To identify this behaviour, displaying the
file and index.dat changes in a timeline is essential since a video viewed
immediately after the result of a search can be said to be likely to be viewed as a
result of that search, particularly if the video title is examined and shown to be
related. This is shown in Figure 12.
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Figure 12: Video access as a result of a search
Furthermore, while cached copies of the search results page have not been found,
if they were recovered, the source of the search results page could be examined to
determine any hyperlinks to the videos that were subsequently viewed.
4.3 Automation
The previous sections described the artefacts left by particular behaviours related
to YouTube video access. This section discusses the extent to which this
reasoning can be automated.
Using a Python based prototype tool, the sequence of extracted artefacts’
metadata was searched for the presence of the various sets of artefacts described
in the previous section. For example in the case of the ‘basic’ YouTube Video
access, a regular expression can be applied to each of the URLs recorded to detect
the ‘watch’ URL:
re.search(r"http://[a-zA-Z0-9]*?\.youtube\.com/watch\?v=([^&]+)", url)
If found then it was also possible to test for the videoplayback file:
re.search(r".*/(videoplayback\[{1}[0-9]].*)$", path)
and to test for the Google Ad, within a similar time period:
re.match(r"(http://googleads.g.doubleclick.net)(.+)(video_doc_id=yt_)(.+?)&
", url)
Similar searches were conducted for the YouTube searches and for videos that
were watched as a result of a suggestion from another page. The output of this
automated process is shown in Figure 13, where the results have been
automatically compiled into an html document.
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Figure 13: The output from the automated process
A summary of the actual actions performed as logged during the experiment
were:
13:35
13:36
13:36
13:37
13:38
13:38
13:47
13:47
13:52
13:53

Launched Internet Explorer
The address www.youtube.com typed into the address bar
YouTube search for ‘keylogger’
“best keylogger ever” video partially watched
“Facebook keylogger” video partially watched from suggested
“How to make a keylogger” video watched in full from suggested
YouTube search for “install a keylogger” typed and “how to install a
keylogger” selected from options presented.
“Install undetectable and untraceable keylogger” video watched in full
Closed Internet Explorer
Windows shutdown

As can be seen above, the events detected correlate with the actual events that
occurred. In addition, as described in Section 2.3, it important to maintain an audit
trail of how the results of an automated analysis tool are obtained. An extract from
the log file is shown in Figure 14.

Figure 14: Output from the log file created while searching for YouTube
related events
The information recorded in the log file makes it relatively straightforward to
manually examine the related artefacts if necessary.
5. EVALUATION
This section evaluates the research conducted. Each of the stages of the research
is examined in turn.
5.1. Artefacts Recovered
This research has examined the artefacts left by visiting YouTube using Internet
Explorer 8 on Windows 7 only. There are many other permutations of operating
system and browser that are likely to produce artefacts in different locations and
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different formats. This could include other web browsers such as Firefox,
Chrome, Safari and Opera, on different operating systems such as Windows XP,
Vista and possibly Mac OS X and Linux. It has also not considered the artefacts
left on dedicated apps such as those found on iOS. In addition, while the file
system, Registry and index.dats are examined for artefacts, other locations that
can contain relevant artefacts were not parsed e.g. Windows Search database.
5.2 User Behaviour
The behaviours examined were:


The viewing of a video,



The viewing of a video as a result of a YouTube suggested video,



A YouTube search,



The viewing of a video as a result of a YouTube search.

There are obviously other behaviours associated with YouTube video access that
have not yet been explored, e.g. viewing a YouTube video embedded in another
web site, or multiple visits to the same website. Nevertheless, the methodology
used to determine the artefacts left can be easily applied to other behaviours.
5.3 Automation
The initial results of the automation are promising. Scanning for the identified
artefacts has proven successful in detecting different types of visits and of
YouTube searches. The tool also logs the tests performed and the reasoning for
the output produced and makes it straightforward to check both the reasoning and
for the presence of (or lack of) artefacts detected. However, it is important to
remember that while it is relatively straightforward to perform an action and
determine the artefacts left, care must be taken in stating that something definitely
happened because certain artefacts are present. This is because there may be
alternative explanations for the same set of artefacts. However, the artefacts found
would be consistent with the inferred behaviour and this does not negate the
validity and value of this approach. In fact the automation of the process
combined with thorough logging means that larger numbers of artefacts that
support a particular inference could be examined, which could reduce the chances
of reaching incorrect conclusions.
6. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
This research has identified several artefacts of interest related to YouTube
activity and it has shown how they relate to user actions. In terms of future work,
as discussed in the evaluation section, there is much work to be done on other
operating systems and using different web-browsers. There is also much more
research that can be performed to further understand the makeup of the YouTube
URL strings and what else can be inferred from them. Also the artefacts deposited
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by uploading videos to YouTube may be of interest.
Finally, the research has shown that some automation in terms of summarising the
activity on a computer system is possible, in this case the use of YouTube.
However, detailed logging and transparent reasoning for conclusions being drawn
is believed to be essential and requires further work. Nevertheless, given the
increasing volumes of data, increasing numbers of digital devices and in most
cases limited resources, having some indication of which specific systems need to
be prioritised is desirable.
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